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In the most general sense, the concept of 
emancipation refers to an entity’s liberation 
from control, dependence, restraint, confine- 
ment, restriction, repression, slavery, or 
domination. The term has its etymological 
origin in the Latin word emancipare, which is 
derived from ex manu capere, that is, from the 
prefix “ex” (“from”), the noun “manus” 
(“hand”), and the verb “capere” (“to take”). 
Thus, while the Latin verb emancipare liter- 
ally means “to take from the hand,” the 
English verb “to emancipate” is used to 
capture the idea of “freeing or releasing 
something or somebody from dependence 
upon something or somebody  else.”  The 
Latin terms “mancipium” (“slave”), “manci- 
pator” (“slaveholder”), and “mancipatio” 
(“verbal contract concerning the handover of 
ownership”) indicate that the notion of eman- 
cipare originally referred to the idea of “trans- 
ferring ownership of something or somebody 
to someone else,” notably the conveyance of 
an object, a person’s release from slavery, or 
an individual’s exemption from paternal 
authority. In modern English, the term 
“emancipation” commonly describes the 
transition from heteronomy to autonomy, 
from dependence to freedom, or from alien- 
ation to self-realization. Rather than estab- 
lishing a universally applicable definition of 
the term, however, it is important to bear in 
mind that the concept of emancipation has 
been, and continues to be, used in different 
contexts and given meaning from diverging 
ideological angles. In order to illustrate the 
complexity of the term, this entry will 
consider the following:  different  elements  of 
emancipation, different conceptions of 
emancipation, and different movements of 
emancipation. 
Different Elements of Emancipation 
As stated above, in the most general sense, the 
concept of emancipation designates an entity’s 
liberation from control, dependence, restraint, 
confinement, restriction, repression, slavery, or 
domination. Yet, such a broad definition tells 
us little about the nature of emancipation. 
Hence, it makes sense to examine three central 
dimensions of the above definition in some 
detail: (i) the type of “entity” considered as the 
carrier of emancipation, (ii) the form of 
“liberation” underlying the process of emanci- 
pation, and (iii) the mode of “control” consti- 
tuting an obstacle to emancipation. 
i. Carriers of emancipation are generally 
thought to be human. The view that 
human beings have the capacity to convert 
themselves into protagonists of emancipa- 
tion is expressed in various intellectual 
traditions that are based on different 
understandings of the subject. Among the 
most influential conceptions of the subject 
in modern social and political  thought  
are the following: the thinking subject 
(Descartes), the rational subject (Kant), 
the sociohistorical subject (Hegel), the 
working subject (Marx), the unconscious 
subject (Freud), the linguistic subject 
(Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur), the 
experiencing subject (Husserl), the bodily 
subject (Merleau-Ponty and Foucault), the 
desiring subject (Lacan and Deleuze), and 
the communicative subject (Habermas). 
Regardless of which particular account of 
the subject is chosen to identify an 
individual or collective carrier of emanci- 
pation, entities capable of liberating them- 
selves from repressive forms of power and 
control tend to be conceived of as human 
actors. In fact, in modern social and 
political thought, most theories of eman- 
cipation have been inextricably linked to 
the concept of the subject. Of course, one 
 
 
 may have good reason to be critical of 
such  an  anthropocentric  interpretation 
of emancipation: on religious or quasi- 
religious grounds, one may claim that 
spiritual or divine forces can be a source of 
emancipation; on vitalist grounds, one 
may assume that, in principle, all living 
beings can be emancipated, or even eman- 
cipate themselves, from exogenous forces 
controlling their development; on envi- 
ronmentalist grounds, one may contend 
that the natural world can, and indeed 
should, be emancipated from being 
exploited by humans. Nonetheless, the 
predominant position among social and 
political philosophers is that emancipa- 
tion is a process depending on and carried 
out by human actors, who, as rational 
entities, are capable of shaping the condi- 
tions of their existence. 
ii. In the broadest sense, processes of eman- 
cipation are social practices oriented 
toward liberation. The supposition that 
emancipatory processes are tantamount  
to liberating practices is expressed in the 
use of concepts such as “autonomiza- 
tion,” “self-realization,” “transformation,” 
“revolution,” “enlightenment,” and – 
more recently – “empowerment.” What 
kind of processes can or should be char- 
acterized as “liberating” remains a con- 
troversial question; there is little doubt, 
however, that one feature that all forms of 
emancipation have in common is that 
they involve an individual or collective 
entity’s assertion of sovereignty and its 
exemption from one or various  sources 
of relatively arbitrary control. Indeed, 
from a historical perspective, there is no 
doubt that individual or collective actions 
oriented toward liberation from repres- 
sive powers have always been, and will 
always continue to be, a major normative 
impulse of social and political change. To 
be sure, one may have justifiable reserva- 
tions about the possibility of emancipa- 
tion: on ideological grounds, one may 
challenge   the   political   legitimacy   of 
projects aimed at individual or collective 
emancipation; on ethical grounds, one 
may be wary of the fact that most eman- 
cipatory processes involve conflict with, 
or in some cases even the suppression of, 
oppositional forces; on pragmatic 
grounds, one may question the long-term 
viability and sustainability of emancipa- 
tory processes. Nevertheless, whatever 
one makes of these objections, it appears 
to be the case that, rightly or wrongly, all 
processes of emancipation are oriented 
toward achieving particular forms of 
liberation. 
iii. Obstacles to emancipation tend to be 
regarded as detrimental sources of control. 
The common assumption that obstacles to 
emancipation are negative forces, based on 
the relatively arbitrary and arguably illegiti- 
mate exercise of power, is  illustrated  in the 
fact that, in most cases, processes of 
liberation are invoked in opposition to dis- 
empowering experiences, such as “repres- 
sion,” “domination,” “alienation,” “illusion,” 
and “deception.” Notwithstanding the fact 
that, in modern social and political thought, 
there is substantial disagreement over the 
nature and significance of the main obsta- 
cles to emancipation, the theoretical critique 
and practical rejection of existing barriers to 
human development aim to deconstruct  
and remove both material and symbolic 
arrangements that obstruct the unfolding of 
the self-empowering potential of a given 
individual or collective actor. Especially 
those subscribing to conservative values 
may believe to have convincing reasons to 
be suspicious of both small-scale and large-
scale attempts to undermine, or even get rid 
of, established sources of authority and 
control. Nonetheless, from a historical point 
of view, the denunciation of and oppo- 
sition to obstacles preventing individual and 
collective entities from realizing their poten- 
tial have been on the agenda for a long time 
and are likely to continue to be of central 
importance to the political organization of 
social life in the  future. 
 Different Conceptions of Emancipation 
Similar to other terminological tools in social 
and political thought, the concept of emancipa- 
tion has acquired various meanings in different 
contexts and in diverging intellectual traditions. 
In Roman law, it was used primarily as a 
technical term referring to the granting of legal 
rights; in the modern era, it obtained a new and 
broader meaning: the emphasis shifted from a 
person’s (passive) obtainment of legal rights to a 
subject’s (active) self-liberation from disempow- 
ering forms of control. By the end of the eigh- 
teenth century, the concept of emancipation had 
become a political term describing individual or 
collective processes oriented toward the asser- 
tion of personal or social autonomy. Among the 
most influential thinkers shaping modern 
approaches to emancipation were the philoso- 
phers Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78), 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Georg W. F. Hegel 
(1770–1831), and Karl Marx (1818–83). Their 
writings gave rise to the intellectual development 
of Rousseauian, Kantian, Hegelian, and Marxist 
approaches to emancipation. 
Philosophical approaches to emancipation 
drawing on the work of Rousseau typically 
refer to his famous assertion that “man is born 
free, and everywhere he is in chains” (1996 
[1762]: 465). Rousseau is widely recognized as 
one of the first philosophers to draw a distinc- 
tion between “natural” and “social” inequality. 
This distinction allows him to argue that, in 
collective life forms whose economic organiza- 
tion is based on private property, inequality 
derives mainly from social, rather than from 
biological or physical, differences between 
people. Rousseau eloquently articulates this 
perspective in the following passage: 
The first person who, having enclosed a plot of 
land, took it into his head to say this is mine and 
found people simple enough to believe him, 
was the true founder of civil society. What 
crimes, wars, murders, what miseries and 
horrors would the human race have been 
spared, had someone pulled up the stakes or 
filled in the ditch and cried out to his fellow 
men: “Do not listen to this impostor. You are 
lost  if  you  forget  that  the  fruits  of the earth 
belong to all and the earth to no one!” 
(Rousseau 1996 [1755]: 431, emphasis original) 
Thus, far from regarding private property as 
a natural right and social inequality as an inevi- 
table given, Rousseau considers both as histor- 
ical products of bourgeois society. Furthermore, 
he takes the pessimistic view that, due to the 
historical transition from the state of nature to 
the establishment of society, human beings 
have gradually alienated themselves from the 
roots of their existence. The state of nature was 
essentially a primitive condition characterized 
by the absence of law, morality, and social 
conventions; the development of society, by 
contrast, is contingent upon the emergence of 
an ever greater division of labor and private 
property, both of which are protected by 
political and legal institutions. While rejecting 
any illusions about the possibility of returning 
to the state of nature, Rousseau suggests that, 
by joining together into civil society on the 
basis of a social contract, individuals are not 
only able to preserve themselves as human 
beings but also have the opportunity to remain 
free as citizens. Rousseau’s defence of freedom 
and equality, epitomized in the concept of the 
“general will” (volonté générale), represents a 
cornerstone for modern conceptions of social 
and political emancipation based on normative 
ideals such as “popular sovereignty,” “direct 
democracy,” and “fairness of opportunity.” 
Philosophical approaches to emancipation 
referring to Kant’s oeuvre draw attention to 
comments made in The Conflict of the Faculties 
(1979 [1798]). In this study, Kant considers the 
possibility of overcoming subjugation and 
immaturity; he does so by reflecting on the 
sociohistorical significance of the French 
Revolution and the Enlightenment, both of 
which he believes to have substantially con- 
tributed to the gradual coming of age of the 
human race. Similar to other Enlightenment 
philosophers, Kant stresses the empowering 
potential inherent in human subjects’ ability to 
raise themselves out of nature by making use 
of their rational capacity (Verstand) and 
thereby gaining control over their environ- 
ment. Yet, from a Kantian perspective, society’s 
 maturation process toward moral progress and 
enlightenment depends on the unfolding of 
reason (Vernunft): autonomy and responsibility 
are derived from the subject’s moral capacity to 
shape the world on the basis of ethical commit- 
ments and ideals. On this account, actions driven 
by inclination or affection lack moral value; an 
action has moral worth only insofar as it is moti- 
vated by rational considerations based on univer- 
salizable principles. This conviction is most 
succinctly expressed in Kant’s “categorical imper- 
ative,” according to which humans are required to 
act in conformity with moral maxims that can be 
regarded as universal laws to be respected by 
everyone (see esp. Kant 2003 [1785]). 
Although the term “emancipation” is not 
part of Kant’s conceptual apparatus, his 
“categorical imperative” is founded on the 
assumption that humans can liberate them- 
selves from their “lower faculties,” such as incli- 
nation and self-interest, because their rational 
capacity permits them to follow unconditional 
moral principles, which can be justified as ends 
in themselves. On this view, emancipation is 
tantamount to rationally motivated enlighten- 
ment. In his groundbreaking article An Answer 
to the Question: “What Is Enlightenment?” 
(2009 [1784]), Kant insists that the coming of 
age of humanity is inconceivable without peo- 
ple’s ability to emerge from their self-incurred 
immaturity by making use of their rational 
capacity, which equips them with a sense of 
personal autonomy and moral responsibility. 
From this perspective, the free and public use 
of reason is a precondition for society’s emanci- 
pation from prejudice and superstition. 
Philosophical approaches to emancipation 
inspired by the writings of Hegel draw on his 
reflections on the so-called “master–slave 
dialectic,” sometimes referred to as the 
“lordship and bondage” relation, which  can 
be found in a famous passage of his 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1977 [1807]). Given 
the abstract and metaphorical language used in 
this section, it can be interpreted in several 
ways; it is beyond doubt, however, that one of 
the essential themes of this passage is the 
encounter between two self-conscious entities 
whose struggle for power and survival epito- 
mizes the subject’s ontological dependence 
upon processes of mutual recognition. Applied 
to modern debates on emancipation, Hegel’s 
remarks on the “master–slave dialectic” force- 
fully illustrate that human beings, whatever 
their position in society, are not only cognitive 
but also recognitive entities, implying that they 
are capable of cognition (Verstand) only insofar 
as they establish social relations founded on 
mutual recognition(gegenseitige Anerkennung). 
As recognition-dependent and recognition- 
seeking entities, humans cannot possibly strive 
for self-liberation without immersing them- 
selves in processes of socialization, through 
which they can assert their capacity for 
emancipation from historically specific forms 
of domination (see also Hegel 1990 [1825–6]). 
Philosophical approaches to emancipation 
developed in the tradition of Marx’s historical 
materialism are based on the supposition that 
the possibility of individual and collective self- 
realization is not a merely theoretical matter of 
abstract speculation but, first and foremost, a 
practical challenge regarding the historical 
conditions underlying processes of social 
transformation (2000 [1845b]). Marx’s sus- 
tained interest in the concept of emancipation 
is expressed particularly in his early works, 
such as his “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right” (2000 [1843]), “On the Jewish Question” 
(2000 [1844a]), “Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts” (2000 [1844b]), “The Holy 
Family” (2000 [1845a]), “Theses on Feuerbach” 
(2000 [1845b]), and the “Grundrisse” (2000 
[1857–8]). Given the considerable impact of 
Marxist thought on world history, it is worth 
examining Marx’s conception of emancipation 
in some detail. At least seven key assumptions 
underlying his view of emancipation can be 
identified in his writings. 
First, emancipation is restorative. It allows 
for the recovery of human autonomy, indi- 
cating that people have the capacity to liberate 
themselves from detrimental sources of power 
that estrange them from  both  themselves  
and their environment. In Marx’s words, “all 
emancipation is bringing back man’s world and 
 his relationships to man himself ” (2000 
[1844a]: 64). According to this view, the 
restorative function of emancipation enables 
people to return to the essence of their existence. 
Second,    emancipation   is     potentially 
universal. One of Marx’s most famous claims is 
that there is a fundamental difference between 
“political” and “human” emancipation (2000 
[1844a]: esp. 51–4 and 64). In fact, Marx 
sharply criticizes the “uncritical confusion of 
political emancipation and universal human 
emancipation” (2000 [1844a]: 50): the former 
is limited to civilizational achievements, such 
as the separation of state and church, freedom 
of opinion and expression, and the right to 
suffrage; the latter, by contrast, has a universal 
character in that it transcends the particular 
interests of individual citizens or social groups. 
From a Marxian perspective, then, political 
emancipation is restricted in that it rests upon 
“the reduction of man, on the one hand to a 
member of civil society, an egoistic and 
independent individual, on the other hand to a 
citizen, a moral person” (2000 [1844a]: 64). In 
order for human emancipation to be possible, 
“man must recognize his own forces as social 
forces, organize them, and thus no longer sep- 
arate social forces from himself in the form of 
political forces” (64). In this sense, human 
emancipation allows for people’s self-realiza- 
tion, regardless of their political, economic, or 
otherwise defined interests and affiliations. 
Third, emancipation is progressive. Marxian 
thought stands in the Enlightenment tradition 
in emphasizing the empowering nature of 
individual and social forms of evolution. 
Following Marx, we should acknowledge that 
“political emancipation is of course a great 
progress” (2000 [1844a]: 54) and that, although 
“it is not the final form of human emancipation 
in general, it is nevertheless the final form of 
human emancipation inside the present world 
order” (54). According to this account, political 
concessions made to the working class in 
capitalist society can be interpreted as a sign of 
progress toward reaching the final goal of abol- 
ishing private property through revolutionary 
class struggle. 
Fourth, emancipation is transformative. This 
assumption is expressed in Marx’s famous 
assertion that “the philosophers have only 
interpreted the world, in various ways; the 
point is to change it” (2000 [1845b]: 173). The 
decisive step leading to universal human eman- 
cipation is the “abolition of private property” 
(2000 [1844b]: 97), allowing for “the real reap- 
propriation of the human essence by and for 
man” (97). Thus, it is through the transition 
from private to collective ownership of the 
means of production that genuine human 
emancipation, understood as a social process, 
can be achieved. Marx characterizes the 
absence of private property in an advanced 
stage of history as “communism,” representing 
“the genuine solution of the antagonism 
between man and nature and between man and 
man” (97). If, following Marx, communism is 
regarded as the “whole movement of history” 
and “the consciously comprehended process of 
its becoming” (97), then human emancipation 
can be conceived of as a never-ending process. 
From this point of view, the abolition of private 
property can be only the first, albeit a 
fundamental, step toward the consolidation of 
an emancipatory society. 
Fifth, emancipation is empowering. Given 
the foundational status ascribed to labor within 
the Marxian architecture of the social, alien- 
ation from labor is tantamount to alienation 
from the human condition. To the extent that 
alienated labor is “not the satisfaction of a need 
but only a means to satisfy needs outside itself ” 
(2000 [1844b]: 88), emancipated labor is not a 
means to satisfy needs outside itself but the sat- 
isfaction of a need itself. According to Marx, 
the exploited worker is alienated (i) from his 
product, (ii) from other producers, (iii) from 
the production process, and (iv) from himself 
as a species-being (2000 [1844b]: 85–95). The 
exploited worker experiences (i) the alienation 
from his product, which appears “as an alien 
object that has power over him” (89), (ii) the 
alienation from other producers, who are 
caught up in “the alienation of man from man” 
(91), (iii) the alienation from the production 
process, which imposes itself “as an activity 
 directed against himself, independent of him 
and not belonging to him” (89), and (iv) the 
alienation from himself as a species-being, that 
is, it alienates from man his “human essence” 
(91). From this perspective, the emancipation 
of the alienated worker is inconceivable 
without the empowering recovery of the (i) 
purposive, (ii) cooperative, (iii) creative, and (iv) 
species-constitutive potentials inherent in labor. 
Sixth, emancipation is unifying. According to 
Marxian parameters, genuine human eman- 
cipation  involves  not  only the  elimination 
of social domination  through  the  abolition 
of private property, but also the possibility of 
self-realization through the abolition of the 
division of labor. The proper unfolding of 
people’s purposive, cooperative, and creative 
potentials requires the consolidation of a 
reality that succeeds in overcoming the material 
and symbolic antagonisms created by class- 
divided societies. The artificial separation bet- 
ween different types of labor – manual versus 
intellectual, concrete versus abstract, male 
versus female, paid versus unpaid, public 
versus domestic – has no place in a classless 
society in which everybody has not only the 
right but also the opportunity to develop their 
purposive, cooperative, and creative capacities 
and thereby transcend the stratifying logic of 
class-based realities. In this sense, genuine 
emancipation is a unifying effort guided by the 
principle “from each according to his ability, to 
each according to his needs!” (2000 [1875]: 615). 
Seventh, emancipation is self-initiated. In 
fact, according to Marx, genuine emancipation 
must be self-initiated: “the proletariat can and 
must free itself. But it cannot free itself without 
abolishing the conditions of its own life. It 
cannot abolish the conditions of its own life 
without abolishing all the inhuman conditions 
of life of society today which are summed up in 
its own situation” (2000 [1845a]: 149). Yet, 
Marx’s contention that genuine forms of social 
emancipation derive from self-emancipation 
appears to provide as many answers as it 
poses questions. On the one hand, Marx sug- 
gests that genuine emancipation is not an exog- 
enously  orchestrated   mechanism,  imposed 
upon society by the state or an intellectual 
avant-garde “from above,” but, rather, an 
endogenously realized process, carried out by 
the revolutionary subject, the working class, 
“from below.” On the other hand, historical 
examples of socialist revolutions have shown 
that Marx’s plea for a “dictatorship of the prole- 
tariat” is fraught with difficulties and has, in 
practice, often led to the establishment of total- 
itarian regimes, whose working classes were 
largely alienated from the political elites by 
which they were governed. Notwithstanding 
the controversial nature of revolutionary pro- 
jects, the notion that a class “in itself ” (which 
exists as a class) needs to convert itself into a 
class “for itself ” (which is aware of itself as a 
class) remains crucial to the orthodox Marxist 
conviction that the historical mission of the 
working class is to take on its role as the revolu- 
tionary subject, whose political actions can 
bring about universal human emancipation. 
Routes to socialist emancipation 
By the early twentieth century, competing 
traditions and tendencies had emerged within 
the socialist movement, which was profoundly 
divided by two major issues: the question of 
its goals and objectives and the question of its 
means and strategies. The former issue, regarding 
the ideological question “What do we want?,” 
illustrates that different socialist currents 
embrace divergent conceptions of socialism; 
the latter issue, concerning the strategic 
question “How do we get there?,” is reflected in 
the rivalry between revolutionary and reformist 
routes to socialism. 
Among the most influential revolutionary 
socialists were Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805–81), 
Karl Marx (1818–83), Friedrich Engels 
(1820–95), Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870–1924), 
and Rosa Luxemburg (1871–1919). Despite 
being separated by substantial ideological 
differences, they had, among other aspects, 
one important thing in common: they were 
resolutely opposed to the liberal promises of 
“bourgeois democracy” and in favor of employ- 
ing revolutionary tactics to overthrow the 
“bourgeois state”  and  thereby  convert  the 
 “dictatorship of the proletariat” into a necessary 
step toward human emancipation. 
Among the most prominent reformist 
socialists were Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–64), 
Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932), Karl Kautsky 
(1854–1938),    Beatrice Webb   (1858–1943), 
Sidney Webb (1859–1947), Jean Léon Jaurès 
(1859–1914), Friedrich Ebert (1871–1925), 
and Léon Blum (1872–1950). They essentially 
took the position that the proletarian struggle 
for emancipation could be successful only 
through a shift of emphasis from “class 
struggle” to “class compromise.” Bernstein 
famously claimed that “the movement is every- 
thing and the goal is nothing” (Heywood 1994: 
110), suggesting that, in order to make genuine 
progress toward human emancipation, the 
proletariat should take a pragmatic and con- 
sensual, rather than a dogmatic and confronta- 
tional, stance. 
Critical theory 
Another key source of inspiration for many 
contemporary approaches to emancipation can 
be found in the works of the Frankfurt School, 
notably in the writings of the critical theorists 
Walter Benjamin (1892–1940), Max 
Horkheimer (1895–1973), Theodor W. Adorno 
(1903–69), Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979), and 
Jürgen Habermas (1929–). Although their 
intellectual contributions are situated in the 
tradition of Marxist thought, their works are 
marked by a profound distrust in orthodox 
Marxist approaches to society in general and to 
human emancipation in particular. A central 
concern in their writings is the categorical 
rejection of economic determinism, thereby 
refusing to accept the orthodox Marxist 
premise that so-called “superstructural” 
dimensions of human reality – such as ideology, 
philosophy, politics, law, art, and religion – are 
largely determined by the economic “base” of 
society (see Marx 2000 [1859]). Furthermore, 
they discard the assumption, presumably 
shared by “vulgar Marxists” (Vulgärmarxisten), 
that history is on the side of the working class 
and that the collapse of capitalism is inevitable. 
If anything, the absence or failure of socialist 
revolutions in the economically developed 
countries of “the west” in the twentieth century 
is a sign of the integrative power and ideolog- 
ical elasticity of capitalism, which turned out 
to be a much more resilient and adaptable 
economic system than most revolutionary 
socialists had predicted. 
In line with other critical theorists, Benjamin 
is deeply suspicious not only of reformist 
approaches to emancipation, particularly those 
advocated by social democrats, but also of 
allegedly revolutionary accounts according to 
which the working class should be “given the 
role of the saviour of future generations” 
(1961: 275), permitting it to fulfill its mission 
of converting its own liberation into the 
cornerstone of human emancipation. In con- 
trast to this view, Benjamin insists that three 
dimensions need to be added to the premises 
of Marx’s historical materialism: “the discon- 
tinuity of historical time; the destructive force 
of the working class; the tradition of the 
oppressed” (1972–89: I.3/1246). In other 
words, Benjamin seeks to transcend the evolu- 
tionist, romanticist, and idealist presupposi- 
tions underlying orthodox Marxist conceptions 
of social revolution. From this perspective, it is 
erroneous to conceive of emancipation in 
terms of an outcome produced by continuous 
historical development; rather, it is to be seen 
as the result of largely unforeseeable and dis- 
continuously occurring eruptions. If “there is 
not a moment that would not carry with it its 
revolutionary chance” (1972–89: I.3/1231, 
emphasis original), then radical social trans- 
formations can, in principle, occur at any point 
in time. 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s concern with the 
possibility of emancipation focuses on the 
place of the individual in mass society (Adorno 
& Horkheimer 1997 [1944/69]: 120–67). Their 
account is deeply pessimistic, seeking to dem- 
onstrate that the promises of the Enlightenment 
have been shattered by the historical experi- 
ences of fascism, state socialism, and consumer 
capitalism. 
Horkheimer’s writings contain at least two 
conceptions     of     emancipation:     first,   he 
 vehemently rejects the “bourgeois” conception 
of emancipation based on individual liberty as 
the supreme value of capitalist society (2004 
[1947]: 13 and 92); second, he strongly sup- 
ports a “holistic” conception of emancipation 
aimed at “the deliverance of society from atom- 
ization, an atomization that may reach its peaks 
in periods of collectivization and mass culture” 
(92). On this view, there is no individual eman- 
cipation without social transformation, that is, 
the possibility of genuine self-realization is 
inconceivable without the overthrow of the 
systemic structures leading to human atomiza- 
tion. In this sense, Horkheimer’s conception of 
emancipation goes beyond Marx’s paradigm 
of labor, for the former rejects the latter’s 
productivist presupposition that the “working 
subject” can be regarded as the civilizational 
cornerstone of society in general and of human 
self-realization in particular. 
Similar to Horkheimer, Adorno is renowned 
for having little patience with both “bourgeois” 
and “orthodox Marxist” conceptions of eman- 
cipation. Yet, despite his skepticism toward 
utopian blueprints, which may be considered 
as deceptive expressions of “identity thinking” 
(1973 [1966]), he is willing to attribute a 
number of positive meanings to the concept of 
emancipation in his writings. First, emancipa- 
tion derives from the subject’s assertion of 
autonomy (Mündigkeit): emancipation occurs 
when the subject, “on the basis of its own 
impulse, liberates itself from social convention 
and controls” (1997 [1970]: 231). Second, 
emancipation can be brought about by the sub- 
ject’s use of rationality (Vernunft): “rationality 
would become rational only once it no longer 
repressed the individuated in whose unfolding 
rationality has its right to exist” (1997 [1970]: 
305); from this perspective, the establishment 
of  “a  reasonable  order  of  the  public world” 
(305) is the precondition for the emergence of 
an emancipatory society. Third, emancipation 
does not transcend but reaffirms the subject’s 
dependence upon society (Gesellschaftlichkeit): 
“the emancipation of the individual could suc- 
ceed only to the extent that the individual 
grasps   the   universal   on   which individuals 
depend” (305). Fourth, emancipation cannot 
be divorced from the paradoxical need both to 
accept and to reject the subject’s material deter- 
minacy (Bestimmtheit): 
He who asks what is the goal of an emanci- 
pated society is given answers such as the ful- 
filment of human possibilities or the richness 
of life. Just as the inevitable question is illegit- 
imate, so the repellent assurance of the 
answer is inevitable … There is tenderness 
only in the coarsest demand: that no-one 
shall go hungry any more. Every other seeks 
to apply to a condition that ought to be deter- 
mined by human needs, a mode of human 
conduct adapted to production as an end in 
itself. (Adorno 1978 [1951]: 155–6) 
Finally, emancipation cannot be divorced from 
the subject’s capacity to convert artistic experi- 
ence into a source of social explosiveness 
(Explosivität): 
The source of art’s power of resistance is that 
a realized materialism would at the same time 
be the abolition of materialism, the abolition 
of the domination of material interests. In its 
powerlessness, art anticipates a spirit that 
would only then step forth … A liberated 
society would be beyond the irrationality of 
its faux frais and beyond the ends-means- 
rationality of utility. This is enciphered in art 
and is the source of art’s social explosiveness. 
(Adorno 1997 [1970]: 29 and 227) 
Paradoxically, then, the realization of materi- 
alism is contingent upon the abolition of 
materialism. 
One of Marcuse’s main concerns is the study 
of the systemic elasticity and relative stability 
of late capitalist society (1991 [1964]). Not only 
has liberal democracy become the victorious 
political model and liberal capitalism the tri- 
umphant economic system in most advanced 
societies, but the belief in the possibility of a 
viable alternative appears to be largely discred- 
ited, both among an increasing number of left-
wing intellectuals and among ordinary 
members of society, including the working 
classes. How, Marcuse asks, can we criticize 
relations of domination and claim to uncover 
the systemic forces leading to social alienation, 
 if most people not only consider the social 
order in place to be legitimate but also seem to 
enjoy actively participating in its reproduction? 
Why should we seek to emancipate those who 
do not want to be emancipated or consider 
themselves to be already emancipated when 
the satisfaction of the “false needs” created by 
consumer capitalism “might be most gratifying 
to the individual” (1991 [1964]: 5)? 
Of course, although it may be relatively simple 
to pose these questions, it is extremely difficult 
to respond to them in a persuasive manner. 
Grappling with these questions, social commen- 
tators inspired by the writings of Marcuse share 
one key assumption: if the comprehensive 
integration of the working classes into the 
capitalist system is indicative of anything, it is 
the elasticity and adaptability, rather than the 
instability and illegitimacy, of liberal society. In 
his social diagnosis, Marcuse introduces the 
concept  of   “enforced tolerance”  (1991 [1964]: 
226) to account for the fact that advanced 
capitalist societies have unprecedented material 
and ideological resources to assert their systemic 
sovereignty and political legitimacy on the basis 
of a seemingly limitless, but structurally con- 
fined, celebration of individual liberty. From a 
Marcusian perspective, newly emerging social 
movements, including anti-authoritarian stu- 
dent and peace movements, can play a pivotal 
role in transforming behavioral, ideological, and 
institutional patterns under capitalism, thereby 
subverting the total domination of the 
established order and contributing to the 
construction of emancipatory life forms. 
While Habermas has been criticized for 
abandoning the radical spirit of early critical 
theory, his writings demonstrate a firm com- 
mitment to exploring the possibility of emanci- 
pation from established mechanisms of social 
domination. In fact, as he asserts on a number 
of occasions, the central objective of his 
“linguistic turn” is to provide normative foun- 
dations for critical theory (1987 [1981a] and 
1987 [1981b]). This undertaking is motivated 
by the assumption that any social theory 
concerned with the possibility of human eman- 
cipation needs to demonstrate on what grounds 
both its critique of social domination and its 
pursuit of social liberation can be justified. 
Paving the way for taking on the ambitious task 
of providing normative foundations for critical 
theory, Habermas examines the concept of 
emancipation on three inter-related levels. 
First, on the epistemological level, the early 
Habermas distinguishes between three 
knowledge-constitutive interests (1987 [1968]: 
301–17), whose historical significance is 
reflected in the emergence of three spheres of 
scientific activity: (i) the empirical-analytic sci- 
ences are driven by our technical cognitive 
interest in controlling the world; (ii) the 
historical-hermeneutic sciences are guided by 
our practical cognitive interest in reaching 
communicatively mediated forms of under- 
standing about the world; and (iii) the critically 
oriented sciences articulate our emancipatory 
cognitive interest in liberating the human 
world from dependence on repressive forms of 
power. In brief, human beings are purposive, 
communicative, and reflective entities capable 
of controlling, coordinating, and criticizing the 
conditions of their existence. 
Second, on the philosophical level, Habermas 
considers language to be the key anthropolog- 
ical force allowing for the construction of a 
symbolically mediated and normatively struc- 
tured world. “What raises us out of nature is 
the only thing whose nature we can know: 
language. Through its structure, autonomy and 
responsibility [Mündigkeit] are posited for us. 
Our first sentence expresses unequivocally  
the intention of universal and unconstrained 
consensus” (1987 [1968]: 314, emphasis original). 
According to this contention, people’s commu- 
nicative orientation toward reaching mutual 
understanding (Verständigung) is the basis of 
their discursive ability to reach agreements 
(Einverständnisse) with one another. In fact, 
Habermas goes as far as to assert that the 
emancipatory potential of the human condition 
is built into the very structure of language: “in 
every discourse we are mutually required to 
presuppose an ideal speech situation,” in which 
communication is not impeded by external or 
internal forces other than “the unforced force 
 of the better argument” and which, 
consequently, “excludes systematic distortion 
of communication” (2001 [1984]: 97). It is, in 
other words, because our communicative com- 
petence equips us with a critical capacity that 
we, as a species, have developed a “rational will 
that allows itself to be determined by good 
reasons” (2000: 328) and that puts us in the 
privileged position of being able to claim 
authorship for our personal and collective life 
histories. In short, emancipation begins with 
rational self-determination. 
Third, on the sociological level, Habermas 
conceives of the relationship between emanci- 
pation and domination in terms of the interplay 
between lifeworld and system (1987 [1981a] 
and 1987 [1981b]). The empowering force of 
communicative reason is anchored in the life- 
world, whereas the disempowering force of 
functionalist reason is imposed upon society 
by the system. On this view, the lifeworld, due 
to its predominantly communicative nature, is 
the cradle of social emancipation, while the 
system, because of its instrumental nature, is 
the main structural source of social domina- 
tion. Thus, according to Habermas, social life 
is fundamentally shaped by two forms of ratio- 
nality: communicative rationality, which is 
oriented toward mutual understanding, and 
instrumental rationality, which is oriented 
toward success. The former is the main 
symbolic resource of the lifeworld, in which we 
coordinate our actions by communicating with 
one another. The latter is the driving force of 
the system, which essentially consists of the 
state and the economy. The detrimental 
influence of the system manifests itself in the 
increasing bureaucratization and commodifi- 
cation of society, leading to the gradual colo- 
nization of the lifeworld by the systemic 
imperatives of functionalist reason. Despite his 
critical account of the pathological develop- 
ments caused by systemically steered modern- 
ization processes, Habermas insists that the 
“necessary conditions of an emancipated form 
of life” (2001 [1984]: 99) are built into the 
communicative infrastructure of the lifeworld. 
From  this  perspective,  it  appears that the 
empowering potential inherent in modern 
communicative processes is reflected in the 
discursive challenges posed by social move- 
ments. Their historical significance in shaping 
contemporary discourses of emancipation 
shall be considered in the following section. 
 
Different Movements of Emancipation 
Different movements of emancipation are 
aimed at different forms of transformation and 
opposed to different modes of domination. 
The plurality of modern discourses of emanci- 
pation manifests itself in the multiplicity of 
normative agendas produced by different 
social movements with competing conceptions 
of emancipation: individual emancipation, 
social emancipation, political emancipation, 
economic emancipation, cultural emancipa- 
tion, national emancipation, religious eman- 
cipation, spiritual emancipation, sexual 
emancipation, and bodily emancipation – to 
mention only a few examples. In light of these 
multiple discourses, it is hardly possible to 
attribute normative primacy to one particular 
agenda of emancipation. Rather, we need to 
face up to the fact that we live in a world of 
inter-related, and to some extent interdepen- 
dent, systems of domination and struggles for 
emancipation. 
In contemporary political theory, it is gener- 
ally accepted that modern discourses of eman- 
cipation cannot be separated from the 
emergence of social movements (Scott 1990; 
Laraña, Johnston, & Gusfield 1994; della 
Porta & Mario Diani 2006 [1999]). Social move- 
ments are widely regarded as potentially pow- 
erful actors capable of generating discourses of 
emancipation and thereby asserting themselves 
as collective forces of political transformation. 
Most social movements have five essential fea- 
tures. First, they are composed of individuals 
who share similar interests (collective interests): 
for instance, an interest in emancipation from 
discrimination on ethnic, “racial,” religious, 
political, economic, or sexual grounds. Second, 
they are held together by individuals who are 
united  by a sense of common identity (collective 
 identity): for example, by a sense of identity 
defined in ethnic, “racial,” religious, political, 
socioeconomic, sexual, or gender-specific 
terms. Third, they are created and sustained by 
individuals who are both able and willing to 
mobilize themselves by virtue of collective 
forms of action (collective action): through 
violent or peaceful means, small-scale or 
large-scale events, ephemeral or continuous 
practices, physical or virtual gatherings. Fourth, 
they tend to be situated outside conventional 
institutions, such as the state, thereby asserting 
a sense of material and symbolic sovereignty 
based on the experience of a shared reality 
(collective situation): notably, the experience of 
ethnic, racialized, political, economic, and 
gender-specific realities. Fifth, they aim to defend 
or change society, or the position of a specific 
group within it (collective project): in any case, 
their projects are concerned with the material 
and symbolic construction of social reality. In 
brief, members belonging to a particular social 
movement seek to emancipate themselves col- 
lectively on the basis of shared interests, iden- 
tities, practices, realities, and projects. 
In the literature, it has become increasingly 
common to distinguish between “old” and 
“new” social movements. According to this 
typology, we can identify at least six “old” 
social movements, all of which have had, and 
con- tinue to have, a substantial impact on 
modern discourses of emancipation: (i) ethnic 
move- ments, which aim for the recognition 
of a common culture, language, or history; (ii) 
“racial” movements, which either support or 
oppose social discrimination on “racial” 
grounds; (iii) religious movements, whose 
members share a particular faith, expressed in 
specific patterns of belonging and believing; 
(iv) suffrage movements, which struggle for the 
universal recognition of democratic and par- 
ticipatory rights; (v) class movements, which 
seek to defend the collective interests of socio- 
economically defined groups; and (vi) feminist 
movements, which are opposed to sexual and 
gender-based forms of discrimination. 
In addition to these “classical” collective 
actors, we can identify a large number of “new” 
social movements that have had a significant 
impact on discourses of emancipation in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
Among the most significant of these move- 
ments are the following: environmentalist 
movements, peace movements, antinuclear 
movements, civil rights movements, human 
rights movements, animal rights movements, 
gay and lesbian movements, indigenous move- 
ments, and antiglobalization movements. To be 
sure, the emergence of “new” social move- 
ments does not necessarily mean that “old” 
social movements have disappeared or that 
“modern” political discourses can be consid- 
ered to be irrelevant in an era variously 
described as “late modernity,” “second moder- 
nity,” “reflexive modernity,” “postindustrial 
modernity,” and “postmodernity.” The rise of 
“new” social movements indicates, however, 
that the discourses of emancipation that 
emerged in early modern society are increas- 
ingly competing with the diversified political 
agendas of the late twentieth and early twenty- 
first centuries. 
“Old” social movements (OSMs) and “new” 
social movements (NSMs) can be compared 
and contrasted on a number of levels. (i) 
Objectives: OSMs tend to aim at the transfor- 
mation of social order, whereas NSMs are pri- 
marily concerned with the alteration of social 
values and norms. (ii) Ideology: While OSMs 
commonly subscribe to sets of universal 
values, NSMs tend to be rather diversified and 
normally lack ambitious agendas based on 
ideological metanarratives. (iii) Social base: 
OSMs are relatively homogeneous and largely 
monolithic, as their membership is commonly 
defined by social determinants such as eth- 
nicity, “race,” religion, class, or gender. NSMs 
tend to be heterogeneous and hybrid,  and  
thus their members’ interests and practices 
largely transcend sociostructural divisions. 
(iv) Orientation: OSMs seek to engineer social 
transformations “from above” by conquering, 
or participating in, institutional forms of 
political power. NSMs aim to bring about 
social change “from below” by mobilizing  
the democratic forces of civil society. 
 (v) Organization: OSMs are not necessarily 
hostile to the logic of formal, bureaucratic, 
and vertical forms of organization, whereas 
most NSMs favor loose, flexible, and 
horizontal forms of collective deliberation. 
(vi) Power: OSMs tend to be “power-affirma- 
tive” in the sense that their ultimate aim is the 
seizure of, or at least the participation in, 
political power. NSMs tend to be “power- 
skeptical” in the sense that their discourses 
and practices tend to be suspicious of 
established forms of power, in particular those 
exercised by the state. (vii) Context: OSMs 
emerged in the context of “modern” or 
“industrial” society, arguably the age of ideo- 
logical metanarratives and ambitious norma- 
tive agendas. NSMs entered the historical 
scene with the rise of “late modern” or “post- 
industrial” society, arguably the age of pos- 
tideological micronarratives and grassroots 
politics. 
To the extent that the political landscape of 
advanced societies is shaped by “old” and 
“new” social movements, both the modern 
quest for universal human emancipation 
(“society-as-a-project”) and the postmodern 
search for local and diversified realms of trans- 
formation (“projects-in-society”) are crucial to 
the development of contemporary forms of 
political imagination. 
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